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ABSTRACT  
   
U.S. based multinational firms are able to use foreign subsidiaries as a means to 
reduce their overall tax burden. As disclosure requirements are vague, there is very little 
useful information provided to firm outsiders to analyze a firm’s foreign operations 
activity and earnings. I demonstrate that even sophisticated financial statement users, 
financial analysts, have difficulty predicting the effective tax rate for firms with foreign 
operations, as evidenced by increased forecast errors for multinational firms as compared 
to domestic firms. I examine factors that may contribute to the increased difficulty of 
forecasting for multinationals and find that decreased ETR persistence and the presence 
of a loss may affect the difficulty of the forecasting task, but the presence or quality of 
management forecasts may not. The market finds tax forecasts important as evidenced by 
the positive response to the tax and non-tax components of earnings forecasts. This 
evidence is useful to investors, policy makers, and others interested in the tax activities of 
multinational firms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Many U.S. firms have been increasingly using foreign operations as a way to 
avoid paying U.S. corporate income taxes. Estimates suggest that more than 73 percent of 
Fortune 500 companies utilize tax haven subsidiaries to avoid paying U.S. corporate 
income taxes (ITEP 2017). This phenomenon has received a great deal of attention in the 
popular press and is of interest to regulators and investors alike (e.g., Barinka and 
Drucker 2014; Wood 2014). Research on analysts’ use of tax information has presented 
mixed results. Some studies demonstrate that analysts are unable or unwilling to use tax 
information for their forecasting (e.g., Kim et al. 2015; Plumlee 2003; Weber 2009). In 
contrast, others demonstrate that analysts use tax information to improve their forecasts 
with the tax forecasts providing value-relevant information to the market (e.g. Bratten et 
al. 2017; Mauler 2015). Thus, as multinational firms are much more complex and have 
inconsistencies in the location and use of foreign earnings, analysts may have more 
difficulty forecasting for this type of firm. In this study, I examine analysts’ ability to 
forecast the effective tax rate (ETR) for firms with foreign operations both inside and 
outside of tax haven countries. 
 Firms disclose the names and locations of their subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of the 
Form 10-K. However, SEC Regulation S-K §229.601(b)(21) only requires firms to 
disclose significant subsidiaries, and firms have generally exercised discretion in 
determining which of their subsidiaries meet the SEC’s definition of “significant.”. 
Moreover, firms are not required to disclose detailed financial information for their 
operations in individual countries or even by geographic segment. Under ASC 280, firms 
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may define operating segments and present segment data using a basis other than 
geography (e.g. line of business). Firms are only required to disclose country-level data 
on sales and assets for material countries. Because the disclosure requirements are 
limited, most firms choose to disclose foreign operations in aggregate, limiting the 
amount of useful information to understand the specific geographic operations of the 
firm. Overall, limited financial disclosures create an opaque information environment 
with regard to foreign earnings and foreign cash holdings, two of the items most relevant 
to analysts in estimating ETR.  
 I hypothesize that analysts’ implicit ETR forecasts for multinational firms will be 
less accurate than their forecasts for domestic-only firms. There is very limited useful 
disclosure by multinational firms of financial information for their foreign subsidiaries. 
Thus, analysts may not have clear information on how much is earned and where, what 
will be done with those earnings, and whether or not the earnings will be repatriated to 
the U.S. parent. These factors are all essential to accurate ETR forecasting. If analysts are 
unable to uncover this information, or are hindered by high information processing costs, 
then their forecasts for multinational firms will be less accurate than for domestic firms. 
However, this result is not immediately obvious as multinational firms tend to be very 
large, have relatively stable profits, and operate under a better information environment. 
Moreover, if multinational firms maintain a consistent year-to-year repatriation and 
income shifting strategy, their behavior should be less difficult to predict.  
I test whether analysts’ implicit ETR forecast errors are larger for multinational 
firms than solely domestic firms using a multivariate regression. I then test whether the 
effect on implicit ETR forecast errors differs for multinational firms operating in 
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countries designated as tax havens versus those operating in foreign countries not 
designated as tax havens. Firms operating in tax haven countries may have more to 
“hide” and may be less transparent in their reporting, making the job of forecasting their 
ETRs even more difficult. However, if firms operating both inside and outside of havens 
behave similarly as it relates to their reporting behavior and the consistency of their 
repatriation strategies, then there may be no significant difference in forecasting difficulty 
or the implicit ETR forecast error between these two types of multinationals. 
After finding that the implicit ETR forecast error is greater for multinational firms 
than domestic firms, I conduct three tests to examine likely explanations for why the 
forecasting task may be more difficult for multinational firms. I examine ETR 
persistence, information environment as it relates to management voluntary disclosure, 
and firms with losses. First, I test the persistence of ETR to examine a potential source of 
the difficulty in forecasting for these multinational firms. Relative to domestic firms, 
multinational firms may have more mobile income and assets and thus more flexibility to 
shift income. Given their operations in multiple jurisdictions, multinational firms may 
also exhibit inconsistency in their earnings and repatriation processes. Shifts in the 
location of earnings, the tax rate locally applied to foreign earnings, or the firm’s 
repatriation strategy could all contribute to less consistent ETRs. Thus, I hypothesize that 
the persistence of ETR will be lower for firms with foreign operations both inside and 
outside of tax haven countries. However, this is not altogether obvious as multinational 
firms may use their foreign earnings as a way to manage their worldwide tax costs, 
keeping ETR consistent from year-to-year, thus increasing the persistence of ETR. 
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Second, I conduct a test examining the information environment surrounding 
multinational firms as it relates to management voluntary disclosure. If managers of 
multinational firms are less likely to provide earnings guidance or if that earnings 
guidance is less accurate, analysts will have less quality information about the firm and 
this may lead to increased forecast error. In contrast, if managers issue quality forecasts, 
lack of information from management should not be related to the implicit ETR forecast 
error for multinational firms. 
Third, I examine losses as prior literature has demonstrated that predicting 
earnings for firms with a loss is more difficult than firms with no loss. First, I look at the 
effect of losses on the ETR forecast accuracy for multinational versus domestic firms. 
Then, I look at the sample of multinational firms and examine loss firms more closely by 
separating the firm-year observations into those with a domestic loss, a foreign loss, or 
both a foreign and domestic loss. The presence of a loss may be one factor that leads to 
increased forecast error for analysts’ ETR forecasts for multinationals. 
Finally, I conduct a cumulative abnormal returns test to examine if the market 
reacts to the errors in the analysts’ ETR forecasts. I establish a baseline with a test of the 
market reaction to earnings forecast error. I then separate earnings forecast error into a 
tax component and non-tax component and test these separately to examine if the market 
reacts differently to the two components. 
 I obtain data on foreign operations from the Compustat Historical Segments file, 
data on tax haven use from a hand-collected sample provided by Scott Dyreng, data on 
stock returns from CRSP, and data on analyst and management forecasts from I/B/E/S 
  5 
from 2003 to 2016. As I/B/E/S does not capture analysts’ explicit ETR forecasts, I form 
an implicit forecast by using analysts explicit pre- and post-tax forecasts. 
 I find that analysts’ implicit ETR forecasts are less accurate for multinational 
firms relative to purely domestic firms. My results are consistent with findings in prior 
literature that analysts are either unwilling or unable to process complex tax information. 
In particular, I find that analysts struggle to process the limited information firms provide 
in their foreign operations disclosures as manifest in increased forecast errors of future 
taxes for multinational firms. Due to the limited disclosure requirements for foreign 
operations, firms generally provide little information on their foreign earnings and how 
they intend to strategically deploy foreign earnings. As a result, firm outsiders do not 
have a clear idea of how much a firm has earned in each country, what they intend to do 
with those earnings, and whether or not they will repatriate them. This information is all 
essential to forecasting firm ETR. I demonstrate that even sophisticated financial 
statement users like financial analysts have difficulty uncovering the information needed 
in the foreign operations disclosures to accurately forecast firm ETR.  
In subsequent analyses, I find that for firms operating both inside and outside of 
tax haven countries, analysts’ implicit ETR forecast error is larger relative to domestic 
firms, and that there is no significant difference in analyst forecasting ability between the 
two types of multinationals. This suggests that multinational firms, regardless of the tax 
haven status of their subsidiaries, behave similarly as it relates to the disclosure of their 
foreign earnings and the consistency of their repatriation strategy.  
To look closer at why accurate forecasting is more difficult for multinational 
firms, I investigate the year-to-year persistence of ETR and find that for firms operating 
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both inside and outside of haven countries, the persistence of ETR is significantly lower 
relative to domestic-only firms. This provides evidence that firms are not using the 
foreign earnings of their subsidiaries to smooth year-to-year ETR. I also find that 
managers of multinational firms are more likely to issue earnings disclosures and that 
these disclosures do not differ significantly in accuracy from domestic firms. This 
suggests that the increase in analyst forecast error is not due to a lack of quality 
management disclosures. Lastly, I find that the effect of a loss on the difficulty of the 
forecasting task incrementally increases for multinationals and that for multinational 
firms the effect is greatest for a domestic loss. Thus, as in prior literature, analysts have 
more difficulty forecasting for loss firms, and this is especially true for multinational 
firms operating with a loss. 
The cumulative abnormal returns test demonstrates that the market reacts to both 
of the components of the earnings forecast error but that the reaction does not differ 
between the tax and non-tax portions. Further, there is no incremental effect for 
multinational firms or firms operating inside a tax haven. The market responds favorably 
to a positive earnings surprise, regardless if the surprise is for a domestic or multinational 
firm. Moreover, the market responds favorably to a positive surprise in both the tax and 
non-tax components of earnings. A positive surprise in the tax component of earnings 
indicates the tax expense was greater than predicted. Some may view this not as a 
positive shock to the firm as it indicates the firm must pay more in taxes, leaving less 
cash available for investment, dividends, etc. However, it seems the market views this as 
a positive shock, a positive indication of the firm’s performance and a positive indication 
of the firm’s future performance. The positive response to both the tax and non-tax 
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components indicate the market is paying attention to this information and finds it 
relevant when evaluating firm performance. 
 I contribute to the literature on analyst forecasting ability, and more specifically to 
the growing literature on analysts’ tax forecasts. I provide evidence that analysts’ 
forecasts are less accurate for firms operating internationally, suggesting that analysts 
appear unable to digest or learn much from the foreign operations disclosure information 
provided by firms. It seems that the current disclosure requirements make it possible for 
firms to hide their foreign operations activities, even from sophisticated financial 
statement users. This suggests that unsophisticated users, like investors, would also be 
unable to accurately assess the future tax implications of foreign operations. Finally, my 
results demonstrate that analysts’ forecast errors matter to the market as I find a 
significant market response to both the tax and non-tax components of earnings forecasts. 
I also contribute to the literature on the taxation of U.S. multinational firms. 
Understanding whether an important firm intermediary, analysts, can interpret tax 
information is important, especially given growing use of foreign operations and growing 
concerns surrounding the lack of disclosure and the propensity for firms to “hide” 
earnings overseas. I provide evidence that under current disclosure requirements, firms 
do not provide sufficient information for even sophisticated users like analysts to 
interpret and predict the future tax implications of foreign operations activities. It appears 
this phenomenon is not driven by a lack of management earnings disclosures as 
multinationals are more likely to issue voluntary earnings disclosures, and those 
disclosures are of the same quality as disclosures from domestic firms. Moreover, the 
effect seems to supersede any proprietary information analysts are able to obtain from 
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their own networks and sources. Regulators seem to be aware of the potential challenges 
of the current disclosure requirements. In 2016, the SEC requested comments on 
Regulation S-K, which seeks to tighten these regulations.1 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background and 
hypothesis development. Chapter 3 outlines the data, models, and research methodology 
used to test the hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the results and Chapter 5 concludes. 
                                               
1 For example, see: https://www.sidley.com/-/media/update-pdfs/2016/04/sidley-update-re-reg-sk-concept-
release-april-2016.pdf 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Foreign Operations  
Prior to the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, the U.S. operated under 
a worldwide taxation system. This paper focuses on the setting prior to 2018 before the 
passage of this Act is likely to change firm incentives .2 Under U.S. corporate tax law, the 
worldwide income of multinational firms based in the U.S. is subject to taxation in the 
U.S. at the federal rate. For example, if a U.S. multinational earns $100 in the U.S. and 
$100 in a foreign country, the whole $200 is subject to taxation at the 35% U.S. corporate 
income tax rate. Importantly, that $100 of foreign income may also be subject to taxation 
in the foreign country, independent of U.S. tax law. The U.S. provides a foreign tax credit 
for taxes paid on foreign income to foreign countries. So, if that same $100 was taxed in 
the foreign country at 15%, the U.S. would give the firm a $15 credit for those foreign 
taxes paid. Instead of a U.S. tax liability of $35 (35% x $100) on the $100 of foreign 
income, the firm would have a U.S. tax liability of $20 ($35-$15). Thus, foreign 
operations in countries with very low tax rates create the potential for even greater tax 
liabilities to the U.S. government, when foreign income is repatriated. 
 A second important caveat to the U.S. worldwide taxation system is that earned 
income from foreign subsidiaries is not taxed by the U.S. until it is repatriated to the U.S. 
                                               
2 The TCJA reduced the U.S. corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21% and moved the U.S. more toward 
a territorial-style taxation system (as opposed to worldwide) in which income is only subject to taxation in 
the country in which it was earned. It also instituted a one-time, deemed repatriation tax of 8% on 
accumulated foreign earnings (15.5% on aggregate foreign cash). Changes under TCJA may alter firm 
incentives related to foreign operations and income shifting but may not impact the forecasting task 
difficulty for analysts. Analysts may not be better able to predict future foreign earnings or a firm’s 
repatriation strategy than they were prior to the passage of the TCJA. 
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Thus, profits kept abroad will not trigger any U.S. tax liability until the foreign 
subsidiaries remit their earnings to the U.S. parent via a dividend. U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provide an option within ASC 740 for 
companies to avoid recording a tax expense (and associated liability) for this potential 
future U.S. tax if the company designates their subsidiary’s foreign profits ‘indefinitely 
reinvested’. Prior research suggests these two treatments, deferral of U.S. tax on earnings 
in foreign subsidiaries and the ability to avoid recording a deferred GAAP tax liability for 
eventual U.S. tax upon repatriation explain, in large part, why U.S. multinationals 
maintain large amounts of foreign cash holdings (Foley et al. 2007). According to 
Moody’s, U.S. multinationals have approximately $1.4 trillion in offshore cash holdings.3 
The prospect of incurring U.S. tax costs causes these cash holdings to be considered 
“locked-out” of the U.S. and only available for use overseas; ASC 740 requires firms 
designating earnings as ‘indefinitely reinvested’ to attest they have no intention of 
bringing the money to the U.S. The ability to avoid paying current U.S. taxes on income 
earned in foreign subsidiaries in countries with low tax rates has created an incentive for 
companies to shift operations and profits abroad and to keep those profits abroad. 
Dyreng et al. (2017) demonstrate an upward trend in the multinationality of firms 
over time with only 40% of their sample considered a multinational in 1988 and nearly 
70% in 2012. Correspondingly, they also find a decrease in the effective tax rate for these 
multinational firms over time. This is largely explained by a decline in foreign statutory 
tax rates. Many foreign countries have reduced their corporate income tax rates over time 
leading to an overall reduction in the tax liability on the foreign income of multinationals. 
                                               
3 http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/02/investing/us-tax-companies-overseas-cash/index.html 
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This downward trend in foreign statutory tax rates creates an even greater incentive for 
firms to engage in overseas operations and maintain cash holdings overseas.  
 Multinationals also use foreign operations to avoid paying U.S. corporate income 
taxes through artificial income shifting, shifting income from high tax jurisdictions (like 
the U.S.) to low tax jurisdictions (like a foreign tax haven) in an effort to reduce the 
firm’s overall tax burden. This strategy is particularly prevalent in industries with large 
intangible assets, like pharmaceuticals and technology (De Simone et al. 2014). For 
example, a U.S.-based pharmaceutical company can transfer ownership of a drug patent 
from its U.S. headquarters to a low-tax foreign subsidiary, like Ireland. The Irish 
subsidiary would then charge royalties to the U.S. headquarters for use of the patent 
thereby moving the earnings from the U.S. to the Irish subsidiary. Because Ireland has a 
much lower corporate tax rate than the U.S., the firm significantly reduces its tax burden 
on the earnings for that drug.  
 The process of income shifting is highly opaque and firm outsiders have very 
little useful information on the volume or specifics of a multinational’s transfer pricing 
activity (Dischinger and Riedel 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel 2012). As a result, income 
shifting creates an additional layer of opacity for firm outsiders. If firms do not regularly 
repatriate income earned abroad, and there is no established pattern of behavior, the task 
of forecasting future tax rates will be more difficult. As a result, analysts may have more 
difficulty forecasting for these types of firms. 
In Exhibit 21 of the Form 10-K, firms are required to disclose the countries where 
their significant subsidiaries are located. However, firms are not required to disclose 
financial information for these subsidiaries. As a result, outsiders are able to identify the 
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countries in which the firm may operate, but most often firm outsiders cannot observe the 
income earned or cash held in those countries due to the lack of financial information for 
the individual foreign subsidiaries.  
Country-level disclosure of operations is addressed in financial reporting 
requirement ASC 280. Firms are required to disclose sales and assets, but not profits, for 
each material country in which they operate. However, the definition of materiality is 
vague and is left, for the most part, to the discretion of management. For countries 
considered immaterial, financial information can be aggregated. As the guidelines in 
ASC 280 are limited, most multinational firms take advantage and do not disclose the 
activities of their foreign operations on a country-by-country basis. Instead, firms tend to 
provide an aggregate high-level disclosure of overall foreign operations or foreign 
operations by region. Because the information is provided in aggregate, firm outsiders do 
not have specific information on exactly where the company operates or financial 
information related to individual foreign subsidiaries. In fact, Gramlich and Whiteaker-
Poe (2013) document that 98 percent of Google’s subsidiaries and 99 percent of Oracle’s 
subsidiaries disappeared from Exhibit 21 of their Form 10-Ks between 2009 and 2010, 
even though the authors later found the vast majority of these subsidiaries were still 
active. This finding illustrates firms’ incentives to aggregate their disclosure of foreign 
operations. 
As a result of the incentives created by the U.S. worldwide taxation system, many 
large firms will maintain large amounts of cash overseas (Krull 2004). These large cash 
holdings as well as current earnings are relatively invisible to firm outsiders due to the 
limited reporting requirements for foreign operations. Even disclosures of permanently 
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reinvested earnings and the estimate of deferred tax liability associated with those 
earnings, when disclosed, are not wholly relevant or useful for firm valuation (Bauman 
and Shaw 2008).  
For firms that choose to disclose foreign earnings, disclosures most likely will not 
provide outsiders with a clear picture of how the foreign earnings will be used. U.S. 
multinationals operating in foreign countries have many options for the use of their 
overseas earnings.  Firms can repatriate earnings for reinvestment in the U.S. but face 
U.S. residual taxes if they choose to repatriate earnings. Alternatively, firms can keep 
money overseas for investment, operations, other business strategies, or simply stash the 
cash. Research suggests that firms hold approximately 45 percent of their permanently 
reinvested earnings in financial assets, meaning that more than half of the foreign 
earnings of U.S. multinationals are not readily available for repatriation (Blouin et al. 
2014). Hanlon et al. (2015) document that firm strategies as they relate to foreign cash 
also affect domestic operations and investment strategies. For example, having 
accumulated earnings outside the U.S., firms are more likely to engage in foreign (rather 
than domestic) acquisitions. Beyond these studies, the use of foreign cash has not been 
well explored in the literature and is not well understood. As foreign earnings and foreign 
cash holdings have important implications for firm ETR, this information is essential to 
analysts’ accurate forecasting of ETR. Earnings can be generated in any number of 
foreign countries. If analysts do not know from which country the money will be 
repatriated or whether the earnings will be designated as permanently reinvested, the 
analyst will have difficulty in forecasting the ETR. Repatriation from a relatively higher 
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tax jurisdiction has a very different effect on firm ETR than repatriation from a low tax 
jurisdiction.  
Given the limited understanding of firm activities with foreign profits, it is 
difficult for analysts and other firm outsiders to predict which activities a firm might 
undertake. Will the firm keep the money overseas or repatriate? If the pattern is not 
consistent year-to-year, analysts may have difficulty predicting year-to-year earnings and 
hence, year-to-year ETR.  
To add to the complexity of these multinational firms and their tax situations, 
most multinationals operate in multiple foreign countries Each of these countries has its 
own individual tax rates and rules, creating individual incentives for repatriating or not 
repatriating income earned there. Overall, multinational firms consider a variety of 
factors when deciding what to do with their foreign cash holdings, whether they bring 
cash back to the U.S. or use the cash internationally. As ASC 280 does not require 
country -by-country disclosure, and as most firms aggregate their disclosures, parsing out 
the individual tax liabilities and incentives for every country in which a firm operates can 
be very difficult for an outsider like an analyst.  
As firms are not required to disclose detailed reports of their overseas profits and 
cash holdings, investors, analysts, and governments do not have a clear picture of this 
part of the firm’s finances and operating activities. Not only is it unclear how the foreign 
cash will be used by the firm, it is also unclear exactly how much foreign cash the firm 
may have. This setting creates an opaque information environment for outside 
stakeholders of U.S. firms operating overseas. 
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Analysts and Taxes  
 
The literature on analysts’ use of accounting information and earnings forecasting 
behavior is well developed. Prior literature demonstrates that analysts play an important 
role as information intermediaries and firm monitors in the capital markets. For example, 
analyst coverage has been shown to reduce corporate tax aggressiveness (Allen et al. 
2016, McInerney 2010). The literature on analysts and their use of tax information for 
forecasting earnings is less developed but in general demonstrates that analysts fail to 
fully incorporate tax information leading to greater forecast errors for firms with more 
complex tax environments. Plumlee (2003) documents that analysts issuing tax forecasts 
impound less complex tax information to a greater extent than they do more complex 
information. Similarly, analysts have greater earnings forecast errors for firms with larger 
book-tax differences (Weber 2009), firms that are more tax aggressive (Balakrishnan et 
al. 2012), and firms that have greater volatility in their quarterly ETR (Bratten, Gleason, 
Larocque, Mills 2017). Further, Kim, Schmidt, and Wentland (2015) provide evidence 
that analysts incorporate tax information into their annual earnings forecasts differently 
than they incorporate other earnings information in that they underreact to the tax change 
component of earnings. Taken together, these studies suggest that analysts either do not 
have the ability to analyze tax information, or they choose not to because the costs of 
information processing exceed the benefits.  
Post-tax earnings forecasts by analysts have been available for decades. More 
recently, analysts have begun disseminating other types of forecasts (e.g., pre-tax, sales, 
revenue, EBIT). Pre-tax forecasts have become more common resulting in implied 
forecasts of tax expense and estimated tax rates becoming available to the investing 
  16 
public. Correspondingly, researchers have begun to investigate the forecasting activities 
of analysts and their tax forecasts. Bratten et al. (2017) investigate how analysts use and 
improve upon the mandatory ETR forecasts of firm managers.4 They document that 
analysts understand complex tax environments and that as complexity increases, the 
accuracy of their forecasts, relative to managers’ mandatory ETR forecasts, increases. 
This provides evidence that analysts are not naively following manager forecasts but are 
able to improve upon them, contrasting with evidence that analysts ignore or are not able 
to analyze complex tax environments when producing earnings forecasts. Further 
evidence of the usefulness of analyst tax forecasts is documented in Mauler (2015). He 
provides evidence that not only are analyst tax forecasts relatively accurate (compared to 
other forecast types), they are informative to the market, used by investors, and contribute 
to analysts’ monitoring role by reducing tax aggressiveness. 
Prior literature has inconsistent findings as it relates to analysts and their use of 
tax information for forecasting. Some demonstrate that analysts are unable or unwilling 
to use complex tax information and others demonstrate that analysts do use this 
information and improve upon other information sources available to the market. Thus, it 
is not inherently clear how analysts will handle the information contained in firms’ 
foreign operations disclosures when issuing pre-tax and post-tax forecasts. Moreover, the 
setting may not be as complex as it seems as most multinational firms are very large and 
tend to have consistent profits year-to-year. Especially if the firm engages in a consistent 
repatriation and income shifting scheme, over time their tax rate may be relatively 
                                               
4 Under ASC 740-270, managers are required to disclose annualized ETR forecasts each quarter using the 
integral method. 
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persistent year-to-year, making an analyst’s forecasting task less difficult. In addition, 
these large firms tend to have a better information environment on the whole, which may 
off-set some of the disclosure opacity as it relates to foreign operations. Given some 
contradictory evidence in prior literature and considerations of multinational firms’ 
information environment, the effect of foreign operations on analyst forecasting accuracy 
remains an open empirical question. 
Literature has also shown that analysts have the ability to obtain proprietary 
information (even under Regulation Fair Disclosure) from a variety of sources. One 
important source is management earnings conference calls. Mayew (2008) demonstrates 
that analysts can generate new and valuable private information by asking questions on 
earnings conference calls. Analysts’ personal and professional networks may also make it 
possible for them to generate useful private information to aid in their forecasting task 
(Cohen et al. 2010). 
I examine whether the tax activities of multinational firms make forecasting the 
ETR for those firms inherently more difficult than forecasting for domestic firms. 
Foreign operations create an opaque information environment, making it more resource 
intensive and challenging for analysts to collect and analyze the needed information to 
issue forecasts. If this tax information is needed for analysts to produce accurate ETR 
forecasts, and the information is more difficult for analysts to interpret or obtain, then I 
expect analysts’ forecasts of the ETR for those firms will be less accurate. Given the 
ambiguous and subjective reporting requirements for foreign operations, and the large 
effect foreign earnings could have on future firm ETR, I believe analysts will have more 
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difficulty forecasting for multinational firms than purely domestic firms. Therefore, my 
first hypothesis is: 
H1: Analyst ETR forecasts for multinational firms are less accurate than ETR 
forecasts for domestic firms. 
   
An additional layer of complexity is added for firms utilizing foreign tax havens. 
Tax haven countries are considered those that offer a tax rate much lower than the U.S. 
federal rate. Countries are more likely to become a tax haven if they are small, affluent, 
and well-governed (Dharmapala and Hines 2009). Each year, U.S. multinationals are able 
to avoid paying large amounts of U.S. federal income taxes through the use of tax havens. 
The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy estimates that at least 366 of the Fortune 
500 companies utilize tax havens. Firms that have more international operations in 
general, greater intrafirm trade, and higher research and development intensity, are the 
most likely to utilize tax havens (Desai, Foley, Hines 2006). Firms are able to facilitate 
tax avoidance through the use of tax havens by first reducing the foreign tax liability on 
foreign income, and second, by reallocating income away from high-tax jurisdictions. 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) document that firms operating in at least one tax 
haven country have a 1.5 percentage point lower global tax burden than those with no tax 
haven operations. Thus, if a company maintains its profits overseas in the haven, it must 
only pay taxes at the low haven rate, and not pay any taxes on those profits to the U.S. 
government (until the profits are repatriated), resulting in a reduced global tax burden. 
Haven use increases firm complexity (Bennedsen and Zeume 2015) and further increases 
the opacity of the information environment surrounding the firm as additional cash is 
held overseas and firms become less transparent about their overseas activities. 
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Moreover, Akamah, Hope, and Thomas (2018) document that multinational firms with 
foreign operations in tax haven countries tend to aggregate their foreign operations 
disclosures under ASC 280 to a greater extent than those multinationals not operating in 
tax havens. This suggests even greater information opacity for these haven firms relative 
to their multinational peers not operating in tax havens. 
To take a closer look at the ability of analyst to produce ETR forecasts for firms 
with foreign operations, I examine the effect of firms with foreign operations in haven 
(and non-haven) countries. If the tax activities of these haven firms add an additional 
layer of complexity and opacity that make the forecasting task even more difficult, I 
expect the forecast error of analysts’ ETR forecasts to be greater for firms operating in 
tax havens than domestic firms or multinationals not utilizing tax havens. However, if 
firms’ reporting decisions and foreign earnings strategies do not differ greatly among 
multinationals, the ETR forecast errors may not significantly differ. If multinational firms 
behave similarly, regardless of whether their foreign subsidiaries are in havens, the 
forecasting task difficulty may not differ between these two firm types. 
Challenges to Forecasting  
There are many reasons why analysts may have more difficulty forecasting for 
multinational firms. I explore three potential reasons: persistence of ETR, management 
forecasting, and losses. I argue above that factors like increased complexity, decreased 
disclosure, and information environment opacity likely lead to greater analyst forecast 
errors for multinational firms. Below, I examine how these factors impact analysts’ ETR 
forecasts. As noted in prior literature (Dyreng et al. 2017), the presence of foreign 
operations has a measurable effect on the firm’s ETR. If the firm’s repatriation and 
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overall tax strategy differs from year-to-year, the firm’s ETR is unlikely to remain 
constant over time. This lack of persistence in ETR may be one factor leading to the 
difficulty in forecasting ETR for multinationals. 
Analysts tend to underestimate the persistence of ETR changes year-to-year, 
leading to increases in forecast errors for their earnings forecasts (Kim et al. 2015). These 
changes in ETR are relevant, and Schmidt (2006) documents that the tax change 
component of earnings persists and is relevant for forecasts of future earnings. Hanlon 
(2003) documents that taxes are relevant to the persistence of earnings. Earnings are less 
persistent in firm-years with large book-tax differences than firm-years with small book-
tax differences 
Multinational firms may be better able to maintain a persistent ETR as foreign 
earnings are one method of managing earnings (Krull 2004) and could be used similarly 
to smooth ETR year-to-year. Management could choose to shift income and repatriate 
more or less year-to-year in order to manage ETR to maintain a more consistent rate. If 
this is the case, analysts may not have more difficulty forecasting the ETR for these firms 
and forecast error may not increase due to foreign operations. 
However, prior evidence demonstrates that firms are inconsistent in their 
repatriation strategies and ETRs are changing over time. Thus, I believe that the 
persistence of ETR for these multinational firms will be lower than domestic firms and 
investigate whether foreign subsidiaries inside or outside of havens, affects the 
persistence of ETR. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
H2A: The year-to-year persistence of firm ETR is lower for firms with foreign 
operations, both inside and outside of tax havens. 
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An additional factor that may make the analysts’ forecasting task more difficult is 
the availability and quality of disclosures from management. Managers of multinational 
firms may have more discretion in operating and investment decisions and more ability to 
exploit the international environment to the firm’s advantage. This could in turn create 
additional information asymmetry between analysts and management, and analysts may 
have more difficulty predicting managers’ behavior (Duru and Reeb 2002). Managers can 
choose to issue earnings guidance and have a variety of incentives to either disclose or 
not (Healy and Palepu 2001). If managers of multinational firms are opting not to provide 
earnings forecasts, or if their earnings forecasts are less accurate than those of domestic 
firms, the information environment surrounding the firm will be reduced, and this could 
lead to increased forecasting difficulty for the analysts. Thus, as analysts have more 
difficulty forecasting for multinational firms, it may be because the managers of these 
firms are not as likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts. This leads to the second part 
of my second hypothesis: 
H2B: Managers of multinational firms are less likely than managers of domestic 
firms to issue earnings forecasts. 
 
A third factor that may negatively impact analyst forecast accuracy for 
multinational firms is the presence of a loss. Prior literature has shown that analyst 
forecasts are less accurate for loss firms (Das 1996). A multinational firm has the 
potential for a loss domestically, a loss overseas, or a loss both places. This complexity 
may contribute to the increased forecast error for analysts issuing forecasts of 
multinational firms. If analysts already have more difficulty forecasting for loss firms, the 
added complexity of a multinational firm could further exacerbate the presence of a loss. 
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I expect analyst forecast error to be greater for multinational firms with a loss, as stated in 
the third part of my second hypothesis: 
H2C: Analyst implicit ETR forecast error will be greater for multinational firms 
with a loss. 
 
Taken together, these three factors may contribute to the result that analysts’ 
implicit ETR forecast errors are greater for multinational firms than domestic firms. 
Given I have established a difference in forecast accuracy, and explore some reasons 
therefore, it follows to test potential implications of this finding. 
Implications 
To examine the implications of my results, I begin with a cumulative abnormal 
returns test to assess the market’s response to analyst earnings forecast accuracy. I then 
split each earnings forecast into a tax component and a non-tax component to see if the 
market responds differently to the forecast error related to each. Mauler (2015) 
documents that the market does respond to the information in analysts’ tax-related 
forecasts. Thus, I expect the market to react to both the tax and non-tax components of 
the analyst’s forecast and further investigate if this response differs for multinational 
firms or firms operating in tax havens. Thomas and Zhang (2011) posit that a positive 
surprise to tax expense provides an incremental positive signal of future firm 
profitability. Further, Baik et al. (2016) document that the tax expense surprise is 
positively associated with future returns. Thus, I expect the market to respond positively 
to positive surprise in both the tax and non-tax components of the earnings forecast.  My 
third hypothesis explores whether or not investors view analysts’ tax forecasts as value-
relevant information: 
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H3: The market responds positively to the tax and non-tax components of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
It is not altogether obvious if the market will respond to the tax component of the 
forecast. If the majority of the information is contained in the non-tax component, a 
market effect may not be present for the tax portion. Additionally, the market may not 
respond positively to a firm beating a tax forecast, as this means the firm will be paying 
additional taxes than what was forecasted. To some this may seem like a negative signal, 
as it implies a greater cash outflow to the taxing authority, leaving less cash available for 
shareholders. However, given evidence in prior literature that there exists a positive 
relation between stock returns and tax expenses, I expect the market to react positively to 
a positive surprise in the tax component of the earnings forecast. A positive earnings 
surprise overall, as well as a positive tax and non-tax surprise, should provide positive 
signals to the market and result in a positive reaction. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Main Tests  
My main sample combines I/B/E/S, Compustat, and a hand-collected haven data 
set provided by Scott Dyreng, for United States publicly-traded firms. The sample begins 
in 2003 as pre-tax forecasts are not available in I/B/E/S before 2003. The sample ends in 
2016. The haven sample ends in 2014 as that is the last year collected in the haven data 
set. I first obtain all annual pre-tax and post-tax analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S. I include 
an analyst’s first forecast issued within 90 days following the prior year’s earnings 
announcement date. I exclude forecasts for firms with an analyst following of fewer than 
three. I then form the median firm-year consensus, resulting in a sample of 62,934 firm-
years. After excluding observations with missing data, I obtain a final sample of 12,534 
firm-years. Further excluding observations with missing haven data, I obtain a final 
haven sample of 10,502 firm-years. Data for firm fundamentals and control variables are 
taken from Compustat. Details on sample selection can be found in Table 1. 
Many analysts include explicit forecasts of firm ETR (or tax expense) in their 
reports. However, I/B/E/S does not capture these detailed tax forecasts. Thus, I obtain 
data on analysts’ annual one year ahead explicit pre-tax (PRE) and explicit post-tax 
(NET) earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S to construct a sample of implicit ETR forecasts as 
in prior literature (Bratten et al. 2017; Mauler 2015). For each analyst who issues both a 
pre-tax and post-tax forecast for firm i in year t, I include only the analyst’s first pre-tax 
and post-tax forecast for the firm issued within 90 days following the prior year’s 
earnings announcement. The pre-tax and post-tax forecast must be issued on the same 
  25 
day to ensure comparability of the forecasts. The implicit forecasted ETR is constructed 
as: 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡_𝐸𝑇𝑅,- = /0123451623/0123       (1) 
 
I then manually form the consensus implicit ETR forecast for the firm-year by taking the 
median of all individual analysts’ implicit ETR forecasts for that firm-year period. The 
sample is restricted to only firms with an analyst following of three or more in order to 
construct a valid consensus.  
 The actual ETR is calculated as in (1) above using the explicit pre-tax and post-
tax earnings as reported by I/B/E/S. Next, I compute the consensus implicit ETR forecast 
error as the absolute value of the difference between the calculated actual ETR and the 
implicit consensus analyst ETR forecast for the firm-year. I use implicit ETR forecast 
error as the dependent variable in my analyses testing Hypothesis 1. 
 My primary analyses focus on multinational versus domestic firms. I include one 
variable of interest, MNC. Data on foreign operations are taken from the Compustat 
Historical Segments Annual File. If a firm reports one or more foreign segments, it is 
considered to have foreign operations in that year and MNC takes the value of 1.5 I 
explore the effect of foreign operations on analyst implicit ETR forecast error using the 
following multivariate model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝐹𝐸,,-9: = 𝛼< + 𝜶𝟏𝑴𝑵𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛼E𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,,- + 𝛼I𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵,,- + 𝛼M𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,,- +𝛼T𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠,,- + 𝛼W𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑇𝑅_𝐹𝐸,,- + 𝛴[\]^ + 𝜀,,-9:    (2) 
 
                                               
5 I conduct a number of sensitivity tests to ensure my definition of the MNC variable is not driving my 
results. First, I define MNC based on the percent of foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) relative to total pre-tax 
income. Results are qualitatively similar. Next, I define MNC based on the persistence of PIFO and again 
find qualitatively similar results. 
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The dependent variable is the implicit absolute ETR forecast error in year t+1. If foreign 
operations make the forecasting task more difficult, I expect the coefficient for MNC to 
be positive, indicating an increase in forecast error. In a sensitivity test I also test the 
dispersion of implicit ETR as the dependent variable but find no significant effect of 
MNC on dispersion. 
The control variables included are those prior literature has demonstrated have an 
effect on the information environment of a firm (Bratten et al. 2017; Weber 2009). Firm 
size (Size) and analyst following (NAnalyst) have been shown by prior research to 
positively affect the information environment of a firm and increase forecast accuracy 
(Lang and Lundholm 1996). Size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Analyst 
following is the number of analysts following the firm in year t. I expect the coefficients 
on these two controls to be negative, indicating a decrease in forecast error. I include the 
control for market to book ratio (MtoB) as firms with larger market to book ratios are 
considered less complex and are expected to be less difficult to forecast for (Bratten et al. 
2017). I control for accruals as it has been shown that analysts are inefficient with respect 
to the information in accruals leading to increased forecast errors (Bradshaw et al. 2001). 
I use balance sheet information to measure accruals as in Weber (2009). I expect the 
coefficients on both MtoB and Accruals to be negative. Lastly, I control for prior year’s 
forecast error as prior research demonstrates a positive serial correlation in analysts’ 
forecast errors (Abarbanell and Bernard 1992). I include year fixed effects to control for 
time varying differences in the forecasting task difficulty. Industry data are taken from 
I/B/E/S. Industry is coded as a six-digit Sector/Industry/Group (SIG) number. I define 
industry as the first four digits of the SIG code. All standard errors are robust and 
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clustered by firm. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Additional details 
on variable descriptions are presented in Appendix A. 
My next analysis looks more specifically at multinational firms by splitting them 
based on whether they operate in a haven country or not. I include two main variables of 
interest: MNC_Non and MNC_Haven. Data on the location and use of tax havens are 
taken from Scott Dyreng’s website.6 Data include countries in which a firm discloses, via 
Exhibit 21 of form 10-K, significant subsidiaries as required by the SEC. The data are 
complete through 2014. A firm is considered to be operating in a haven if it reports 
significant operations in Exhibit 21 in a country identified as a tax haven in year t, and 
otherwise is considered as a non-haven firm. In alternate specifications, I use the number 
of tax havens and find qualitatively similar results. To form my variables of interest, I 
combine the data on foreign operations with the haven data. MNC_Non takes a value of 1 
for firms with foreign operations that are not operating in a foreign country designated as 
a tax haven, and 0 otherwise. MNC_Haven takes a value of 1 for firms with foreign 
operations in at least one country designated as a tax haven, and 0 otherwise. Thus, firms 
with only domestic operations are captured in the intercept term of the model. If foreign 
operations in non-haven countries make the forecasting task more difficult, I expect the 
coefficient for MNC_Non to be positive, indicating an increase in forecast error. 
Similarly, if operations in foreign tax havens make the forecasting task more difficult, I 
                                               
6 Exhibit 21 data are available from Scott Dyreng’s website 
(https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/Home/data-and-code). “Exhibit 21 in the Form 10-K provides a 
list of the firm’s material subsidiaries, as required by the SEC. The Exhibit 21 materiality benchmark is 
10% of total assets, pre-tax income, or investment per individual subsidiary as well as per an aggregate of 
all non-individually disclosed subsidiaries. Hence, all individually disclosed subsidiaries must constitute 
more than 90% of total assets, income, or investment (Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K).” (taken from 
Akamah, Hope, Thomas WP 2017) 
  28 
expect the coefficient for MNC_Haven to also be positive. I perform an F-test on the 
coefficients for MNC_Non and MNC_Haven to determine if the effects are significantly 
different between the two types of foreign operations. The control variables are the same 
as in Model 2. 
Next, to examine what might be driving the effect of MNC (and MNC_Non and 
MNC_Haven) on forecast error, I explore three factors: ETR persistence, management 
disclosure, and loss. I first examine how the persistence of implicit ETRs varies across 
differences in foreign operations using the following model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅,,-9: = 𝛼< + 𝛼:𝐸𝑇𝑅,,- + 𝛼E𝑀𝑁𝐶,,- + 𝜶𝟑𝑬𝑻𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝑴𝑵𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛴[\]^ + 𝜀,,-9: 
          (3) 
 
 
The dependent variable is calculated actual ETR as reported by I/B/E/S in year t+1 and 
the independent variable is the calculated actual ETR in year t as a main effect and then 
interacted with MNC in Model 3. As a further sensitivity analysis, I replace MNC with 
MNC_Non and MNC_Haven to test the effect of havens. I expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term of ETR*MNC to be negative if foreign operations are associated with 
decreased ETR persistence.  
 To assess whether the presence or quality of management guidance may affect the 
forecast error of analyst ETR forecasts for multinational firms, I conduct analyses of 
management voluntary disclosure in two ways. Management disclosure data are taken 
from I/B/E/S Guide. I construct a sample of annual EPS disclosures of U.S. firms. After 
merging with control variables from Compustat and data on foreign operations, I obtain a 
sample of 29,627 firm-years. I first conduct a test of the likelihood of earnings disclosure 
through the use of a logistic regression of model (4): 
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𝑀_𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑒,,- = 𝛼< + 𝜶𝟏𝑴𝑵𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛼E𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,,- + 𝛼I𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵,,- + 𝛼M𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡,,- +𝛼T𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠,,- + 𝛴[\]^ + 𝜀,-          (4) 
Here, M_Guide takes a value of 1 if management issues one or more voluntary earnings 
disclosures in year t and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are as defined in 
previous models. In a sensitivity test I replace MNC with MNC_Non and MNC_Haven to 
test the effect of havens. If management of multinational firms is less likely to issue 
voluntary disclosure, I expect the coefficient on MNC to be significantly negative. In the 
second test, I examine the effect of MNC on management forecast error of annual EPS 
forecasts. I use Model (2) but replace the dependent variable with the management annual 
EPS forecast error calculated as the difference between the actual EPS and the forecasted 
EPS as reported by I/B/E/S. 
 The third test explores whether having a loss makes forecasting for a firm more 
difficult. I first test this on the entire sample of both multinational and domestic firms. I 
use Model (2) but also include the loss variable and an interaction between Loss and 
MNC. If a loss makes the forecasting task more difficult, I expect the coefficient on Loss 
to be positive. Similarly, if a loss makes the forecasting task for a multinational firm 
incrementally more difficult, I expect the coefficient on MNC*Loss to be positive. Then, I 
take the sample of multinational firms and test three different types of loss occurrence: 
domestic loss (PIDOM < 0, PIFOR > 0), foreign loss (PIDOM > 0, PIFOR < 0), and a 
loss both domestic and foreign (PIDOM < 0, PIFOR < 0). I conduct F-tests of the 
coefficients to confirm if there are significant differences in effects across loss type. 
Again, I used Model (2) but with the addition of the three loss variables and expect the 
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coefficients on each of these variables to be positive, indicating an increase in forecast 
error. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Tests 
 To test my third hypothesis and explore investors’ response to the pre-tax and 
post-tax components of analysts’ forecasts, I conduct a cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) test. I construct this sample by utilizing the last forecast (prior to the earnings 
announcement in year t) issued by an analyst in each firm-year. As before, I eliminate 
firms with fewer than three analysts following and construct the median consensus. I 
obtain returns data from CRSP. After eliminating observations with missing data, I have 
a sample of 10,763 firm-years. This sample is further reduced to 8,696 firm-years when 
eliminating observations that do not have haven data. I first establish a baseline market 
response by testing the following model: 𝐶𝐴𝑅,,- = 𝛼< + 𝜶𝟏𝑬𝑷𝑺_𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛼E𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,,- + 𝛼I𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵,,- + 𝛼M𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚,,- +𝛴[\]^ + 𝜖,,-         (5) 
In Model 5, the variable of interest is EPS_FE, the analyst earnings per share (EPS) 
forecast error. The dependent variable is the standardized market-adjusted 3-day CAR 
centered on the earnings announcement date for year t. In untabulated analyses, I test 
non-standardized CAR and raw CAR, as well as 5-day and 7-day CAR, and find 
qualitatively similar results. EPS forecast error is defined as: 𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐹𝐸 = 5\-mn3omp45\-qrstnmu3vw]^\x	z{-x-]|},|~       (6)  
 Next, I separate the EPS forecast error into two components: tax forecast error 
and non-tax forecast error. I then test the following model: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅,,- = 𝛼< + 𝜶𝟏𝑻𝒂𝒙_𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑻𝒂𝒙_𝑭𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛼I𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒,,- + 𝛼M𝑀𝑡𝑜𝐵,,- +𝛼T𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚,,-	 + 𝛴[\]^ + 𝜖,,-      (7) 
In Model 7, the variables of interest are the Tax forecast error and Non-Tax forecast error 
components of total EPS forecast error. Here, tax forecast error is defined as: 
  𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝐹𝐸 = 160∗/^\6]qrstnmu3vw]^\x	z{-x-]|},|~      (8) 
I define the non-tax forecast error as the difference between EPS forecast error and tax 
forecast error (Model 6 – Model 8). If investors respond to the forecast error, I expect a 
significant and positive sign for the coefficient of EPS_FE, Tax_FE, and PreTax_FE, 
indicating the market is responding to the analysts’ forecast errors. In Model 7, I conduct 
an F-test of the difference between the coefficients of Tax_FE and NonTax_FE. Lastly, I 
conduct CAR analyses including, first, interactions with MNC and, second, interactions 
with MNC_Non and MNC_Haven to explore the effect of foreign operations on the 
market response. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 12,534 firm-years with 
no missing data for variables of interest or control variables. Approximately 71% of firms 
have foreign operations. The average analyst following is 13 analysts with a maximum of 
32. Correlations between variables are presented in Table 3. The Pearson correlations are 
in the top right, and Spearman in the bottom left. Control variables are negatively 
correlated with implicit ETR forecast error, as expected from prior literature. 
I first examine the effect of foreign operations, in general, on analysts’ forecasting 
accuracy. These results are presented in Table 4. Column 1 presents the results on the full 
sample of multinational firms and Column 2 on the smaller haven sample. The model 
includes other factors known to be associated with analyst forecast error as controls. As 
discussed previously, ETR forecast error is calculated as the absolute difference between 
the calculated ETR actual and implicit ETR forecast for year t+1. The results 
demonstrate that increased analyst implicit ETR forecast error is associated with firms 
with foreign operations (coefficient on MNC is 0.0235). The estimated coefficients for 
the control variables are as expected and consistent with prior literature, with the 
exception of Accruals. Larger firms, firms with a larger analyst following, larger market 
to book ratio, and larger accruals, have lower forecast error, indicating that forecasting 
for firms of these types is easier. As in prior literature, the estimated coefficient for 
LagFE is significantly positive, demonstrating positive serial correlation in analyst ETR 
forecast error. 
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 I also investigate if the effect of foreign operations differs for firms operating 
inside or outside of tax haven countries as reported in Table 4 Column 3. I find that both 
haven firms and non-haven firms are more difficult to forecast for than domestic firms, as 
evidenced by the significantly positive estimated coefficients on both MNC_Haven 
(0.0404) and MNC_Non (0.0480). An F-test of the difference between the coefficients 
yields a p-value of 0.6050 suggesting there is no significant difference between the effect 
of haven and non-haven multinational firms. This result is somewhat unexpected, as 
foreign operations in a haven country add additional complexities to the firm which 
would suggest the firm would be more difficult to forecast for than a firm with no 
operations in a tax haven country. However, it seems that analysts may have difficulty 
obtaining and/or processing the information for firms with both types of foreign 
operations. The key difference is between multinational and domestic firms rather than 
between haven and non-haven firms. 
 The results in Table 4 demonstrate that analysts have more difficulty forecasting 
ETR for firms with foreign operations, whether the foreign operations are in a haven or 
not. To explore why this might be true, I conduct a test of three potential factors: 
persistence of ETR, manager forecasts, and losses. 
I first test the persistence of the ETR as it relates to foreign operations and haven. 
These results are presented in Table 5. As expected, prior year ETR is positively related 
to current year ETR as presented in Column 1. The coefficient on the interaction term of 
ETR*MNC (-0.1922) is significantly negative, indicating that foreign operations is 
associated with a significant incremental decrease in the persistence of ETR as compared 
to domestic firms. This supports the prediction in Hypothesis 2A. Column 2 presents that 
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the results also hold when separating the multinational firms into those operating inside 
and outside of havens. When looking at the interaction terms, it can be seen that foreign 
operations in both haven and non-haven countries negatively incrementally impact the 
persistence of ETR. The coefficients for both ETR*MNC_Haven (-0.1895) and 
ETR*MNC_Non (-0.1473) are significantly negative. This suggests that firms with 
foreign operations, in both haven and non-haven countries, have less persistent ETRs, 
supporting Hypothesis 2A. This decrease in persistence may make the year-to-year 
changes in ETR more difficult to predict, leading to the increased forecast errors as 
documented in Table 4. This is one possible explanation for why analysts have more 
difficulty forecasting for multinational firms.  
Next, I test the likelihood and accuracy of management voluntary earnings 
forecasts. If managers of multinational firms are issuing forecasts less frequently or if 
those forecasts are less accurate, the information environment surrounding those firms 
would be of lower quality and could lead to greater difficulty in the forecasting task for 
analysts. In contrast, if managers of multinationals are issuing high quality earnings 
forecasts, this is most probably not a factor that explains the results in Table 4.  
 Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regression testing the 
likelihood of management issuing an annual voluntary earnings forecast. Managers of 
multinational firms are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than managers of 
domestic firms (coefficient of MNC is 0.5861). This does not support the expectation of 
hypothesis 2B. Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of the accuracy test. The dependent 
variable is the absolute manager forecast error. As can be seen in Column 1, there is no 
significant difference between the accuracy of forecasts for managers of multinational 
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firms and managers of domestic firms. Similarly, Column 2 presents that there is no 
significant difference between managers of multinational firms inside or outside of 
havens and managers of domestic firms. Managers of multinational firms are issuing 
earnings forecasts and those earnings forecasts do not significantly differ in accuracy 
from domestic firms, in contrast to the expectation in Hypothesis 2B. Thus, it appears 
that a lack of quality management guidance may not be a factor in why analysts have 
greater difficulty forecasting for multinational firms. 
 Lastly, I examine the effect of losses. Prior literature has demonstrated that loss 
firms are more difficult to forecast for. The results in Panel A of Table 7 support these 
findings and Hypothesis 2C. I also find that analyst forecast error for multinational firms 
with a loss are incrementally less accurate (coefficient of MNC*Loss is 0.0961). Panel B 
of Table 7 presents the results of the test of the sample of multinational firms only. 
Analyst forecasts of multinationals with any type of loss are less accurate. When looking 
at the F-tests of the coefficients, I find that the effect on implicit ETR forecast error of 
domestic losses is greater than the effect of foreign losses. Taken together, this 
demonstrates that analysts have difficulty forecasting for loss firms, incrementally more 
difficulty forecasting for multinational loss firms, and for those multinational loss firms, 
have more difficulty if the loss is a domestic loss. 
 In an untabulated analysis, I conduct a test to determine if persistence or loss may 
be the driving factor to explain the results in Table 4. I first determine which firms are 
considered low ETR persistence firms by conducting a test of the average ETR 
persistence by firm, ranking the firms, then splitting the firms at the median persistence 
coefficient. Firms below the median are considered low persistence firms. I then re-run 
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the analysis in Table 7 for the low persistence and non-low persistence samples. The 
result for MNC*Loss for the low persistence sample is consistent with the result in Table 
7. However, for the non-low persistence sample, the result is not significant. Losses do 
not appear to have a significant incremental effect for multinational firms when ETR 
persistence is high, but the effect is incrementally significant when ETR persistence is 
low. This suggests persistence drives the result for MNC as shown in Table 4, and not 
losses. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, I conduct a CAR analysis. The results are presented in Table 
8. As can be seen in Column 1, the market responds positively to the analysts’ error in 
forecasting earnings. The positive and significant coefficient for EPS_FE (0.1134), 
suggests that the market has a strong positive reaction to a firm beating the analysts’ 
earnings forecast (a positive earnings surprise) where the actual earnings reported is 
greater than the analysts’ forecast. After separating earnings forecasts into the tax and 
non-tax components, it is evident that the market responds to both types of forecast error, 
as presented in Column 2. The market clearly uses the information in the disaggregated 
forecasts, using both the non-tax component and the tax component of analysts’ forecasts 
to measure firm performance. The market has a strong positive reaction to the firm 
beating the analysts’ predictions as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficients on 
Tax_FE (0.1265) and NonTax_FE (0.1140). Columns 3 and 4 show that there is no 
incremental difference in market response for multinational firms overall, nor for 
multinational firms inside tax haven countries. Regardless of the type of firm, the market 
reacts positively to the overall earnings forecast error as well as the tax and non-tax 
components of the earnings forecast error. These results provide support for Hypothesis 3 
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and demonstrate that the market does find tax and non-tax forecasts useful. Thus, analyst 
implicit ETR forecasts are useful and informative to the market when valuing firm 
performance. 
Overall, my results demonstrate that analysts have greater difficulty forecasting 
for multinational firms, regardless of whether the foreign operations are inside or outside 
of tax haven countries. One reason this may be true is that the persistence of a firm’s ETR 
is decreased for those firms with foreign operations (both inside and outside tax havens). 
In addition, losses may contribute to the analyst forecast error as multinational firms with 
a loss either domestically or abroad (or both) are incrementally more difficult to forecast 
for. As managers of multinational firms are more likely to provide earnings forecasts and 
those forecasts are no less accurate than management forecasts of domestic firms, it does 
not appear that a lack of disclosure by management affects analyst ETR forecasts for 
multinationals. Lastly, I show that the market responds to both the tax and non-tax 
components of earnings forecasts and that there is no incremental difference in this 
response for multinational versus domestic firms, showing that the market finds the 
information in both types of forecasts useful and important to firm valuation. These 
results illustrate the difficulty even sophisticated financial statement users have in 
predicting the activities of multinational firms and the tax implications therein. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. based multinational corporations are able to avoid paying billions of dollars 
in taxes to the U.S. government through the use of subsidiaries in low-tax foreign 
jurisdictions and foreign tax havens. Much attention has been paid to firms shifting 
profits from the U.S. to low-tax jurisdictions. My study contributes to the literature by 
demonstrating that even sophisticated financial statement users, financial analysts, are 
unable to accurately process the information contained in foreign operations disclosures 
to predict the future tax implications of foreign operations.  
 More specifically, I demonstrate that analyst implicit ETR forecasts are less 
accurate for firms with foreign operations than those firms operating domestically. 
Further, I demonstrate that this result holds in both haven and non-haven foreign 
jurisdictions and that there is no significant difference between these two settings. One 
reason analysts may have more difficulty predicting ETR for multinational firms is that 
the ETR is less persistent than domestic firms. The instability of firm strategy as it relates 
to foreign earnings seems to lead to an instability in ETR, making it difficult for analysts 
to predict the tax implications of future foreign earnings. Additionally, the presence of a 
loss may contribute to the increased forecast errors for analyst forecasts of multinational 
firms. Further, I show that a lack of accurate management earnings guidance does not 
contribute to the analysts’ difficulty in forecasting for multinationals. I also demonstrate a 
market reaction to the tax and non-tax components of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
illustrating the importance of these forecasts to the capital marketplace. 
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 Overall, I demonstrate a consequence of the opacity of firm disclosures of foreign 
operations and foreign earnings. Current disclosure requirements make it possible for 
firms to better conceal their tax avoiding behavior and even sophisticated financial 
statement users appear unable to uncover and understand these firms’ international tax 
strategies. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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Dependent Variables 
ETR_FE 
Analysts' implicit ETR forecast error. The difference 
between the implicit actual ETR for a firm-year and the 
median consensus forecast of implicit ETR for a firm-
year, taken in absolute value. 
ETR 
Current year actual calculated ETR. Pre-tax earnings 
(PRE) minus post-tax earnings (NET) divided by pre-
tax earnings (PRE), taken from I/B/E/S. 
M_GUIDE Takes the value of 1 if management issues one or more 
EPS forecasts in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
M_EPS_FE 
Management EPS forecast error. The absolute 
difference between actual EPS for the firm-year and 
the forecasted EPS for that firm-year. 
CAR 
The standardized market-adjusted 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns centered on the earnings 
announcement date. 
  
Variables of Interest 
MNC 
Takes the value of 1 if a firm reports one or more 
foreign subsidiaries in the Compustat Historical 
Segments File, and 0 otherwise. 
MNC_Haven 
For firms with foreign operations, takes the value of 
one if the firm reports a significant subsidiary in one or 
more countries designated as a tax haven, and 0 
otherwise. 
MNC_Non 
For firms with foreign operations, takes the value of 
one if the firm reports significant subsidiaries in 
countries that are not designated as a tax haven, and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Control Variables 
Size The size of the firm as measured by the log of total 
assets (AT) as reported in Compustat. 
MtoB 
The ratio of market value to book value, taken from 
Compustat. The number of common shares outstanding 
times the price at the close of the fiscal year, divided 
by total common/ordinary equity. 
(CSHO*PRCC_F)/CEQ 
NAnalyst The number of unique analysts following a firm in year 
t. 
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Accruals 
Firm accruals for year t, scaled by average total assets. 
Following Weber (2009) accruals are measured as: 
(∆Current Assets - ∆Cash) - (∆Current Liabilities - 
∆Debt included in current liabilities) - ∆Deferred Tax 
Liability - Depreciation 
[(∆ACT-∆CHE) - (∆LCT-∆DLC) - ∆TXDITC - DP] 
Loss Takes the value of 1 if a firm reports a loss, as defined 
by negative net income, in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
DomesticLoss 
Takes the value of 1 for a multinational firm reporting 
pre-tax domestic income less than 0 and pre-tax 
foreign income greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
ForeignLoss 
Takes the value of 1 for a multinational firm reporting 
pre-tax domestic income greater than 0 and pre-tax 
foreign income less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
BothLoss 
Takes the value of 1 for a multinational firm reporting 
pre-tax domestic income less than 0 and pre-tax 
foreign income less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
Momentum Market momentum as taken from the Fama-French 
Daily Liquidity Factors database. 
Industry The first four digits of the six digit 
Sector/Industry/Group reported in I/B/E/S. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
  Firm-Years 
Median Consensus of the first forecast within 90 days of the earnings 
announcement for firms with 3 or more analysts following 
62,934 
Less firm-years missing prior year's data for lags -38,478 
Less firm-years missing Compustat data -11,922 
Final MNC Sample 12,534 
Less firm-years missing Haven data -2,034 
Final Haven Sample 10,502 
  
This table presents the sample selection process for the sample of 12,534 firm-years used for the tests of MNC 
and the 10,502 firm-years used for the tests of the effect of tax havens. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Full Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ETR_FE 0.1262 0.0220 0.4517 0 4.4751 
ETR 0.2924 0.3253 0.1375 0 0.9992 
MNC 0.7100 1 0.4538 0 1 
MNC_Non 0.1882 0 0.3909 0 1 
MNC_Haven 0.5356 1 0.4988 0 1 
MtoB 3.4937 2.5700 4.6421 -15.560 30.661 
Size 7.5004 7.4085 1.7055 2.5374 12.637 
NAnalyst 12.540 11 7.2392 3 32 
Accruals -0.0380 -0.0367 0.0558 -0.0276 0.1928 
      
This table present descriptive statistics for the sample of 12,534 firm-year observations. Variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
      
      
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Type   
  MNC Domestic     
 Mean Mean Difference   
ETR_FE 0.1286 0.1205    
ETR 0.2907 0.2967 **   
MtoB 3.4803 3.5265    
Size 7.7181 6.9673 ***   
NAnalyst 13.055 9 ***   
Accruals -0.0358 -0.0431 ***   
      
This table presents the mean statistics for the sample of 8,899 MNC 
firm-year observations and 3,636 domestic firm-year observations and 
the statistical difference between the means. Variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. ***, **, and *, indicate significance (two-
tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3: Correlations 
  ETR_FE ETR MNC MtoB Size NAnalyst Accruals 
ETR_FE 1 -0.0454 
*** 
0.0081 -0.0405 
*** 
-0.0719 
*** 
-0.0549 
*** 
-0.0194 
** 
ETR -0.1110 
*** 
1 -0.0199 
** 
-0.0667 
*** 
0.1814 
*** 
0.0074 -0.0722 
*** 
MNC 0.0708 
*** 
-0.1217 
*** 
1 -0.0045 0.1998 
*** 
0.1113 
*** 
0.0626 
*** 
MtoB -0.2279 
*** 
-0.0883 
*** 
0.0318 
*** 
1 -0.0409 
*** 
0.0910 
*** 
0.0060 
Size -0.0731 
*** 
0.0817 
*** 
0.1988 
*** 
-0.0409 
*** 
1 0.4916 
*** 
-0.0873 
*** 
NAnalyst -0.1207 
*** 
-0.0195 
** 
0.1038 
*** 
0.1787 
*** 
0.5033 
*** 
1 -0.0857 
*** 
Accruals -0.0391 
*** 
-0.0763 
*** 
0.0829 
*** 
0.0348 
*** 
-0.0900 
*** 
-0.0865 
*** 
1 
        
This table presents correlations among the variables used in the main tests. The sample is 12,534 firm-years. 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. ***, **, and *, indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Association between Foreign Operations and Havens and Analysts' Implicit 
ETR Forecast Error 
DV: Median consensus absolute implicit ETR forecast error 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.1756 *** 0.2575 *** 0.2548 *** 
 6.72   8..92  8.87  
MNC 0.0235 *** 0.0427 ***    
 2.57   4.01     
MNC_Non        0.0480 *** 
        3.16  
MNC_Haven        0.0404 *** 
        3.54  
Size -0.0148 *** -0.0266 *** -0.0262 *** 
 -4.98   -7.73  -7.54  
MtoB -0.0034 *** -0.0033 *** -0.0033 *** 
 -4.32   -3.35  -3.54  
NAnalyst -0.0012 ** -0.0010  -0.0010  
 -1.98   -1.54  -1.50  
Accruals -0.1538 ** -0.3234 *** -0.3228 *** 
 -2.06   -3.44  -3.43  
LagFE 0.3829 *** 0.2285 *** 0.2284 *** 
  7.15   7.98   7.98   
  n = 12,534 n = 10,502 n = 10,502 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents results from the test of Model 2, regressing the implicit absolute ETR forecast error on 
MNC and a set of control variables known to affect analyst forecast error, in Column 1. Column 2 presents 
results from the test regressing the implicit absolute ETR forecast error on MNC_Non and MNC_Haven and a 
set of control variables known to affect analyst forecast error. Columns 2 and 3 are run on a smaller sample 
due to limitations in the Haven data. MNC takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations and 0 
for domestic-only firms. MNC_Non takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations that are not in 
a haven country and 0 otherwise. MNC_Haven takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations in 
one or more haven countries, and 0 otherwise. All other variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
Year fixed effects are included. All standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. ***, **, and *, indicate 
significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Association between Foreign Operations and Havens and 
ETR Persistence 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
DV: ETRt+1 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.0895 *** 0.0895 *** 
 10.21  8.73  
ETRt 0.7444 *** 0.7396 *** 
 36.64  30.14  
MNC 0.0503 ***    
 5.83     
ETRt*MNC -0.1922 ***    
 -7.14     
MNC_Non    0.0452 *** 
    3.20  
ETRt*MNC_Non    -0.1473 *** 
    -3.54  
MNC_Haven    0.0479 *** 
    4.32  
ETRt*MNC_Haven    -0.1895 *** 
      -5.58   
 n = 12,534 n = 10,502 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
This table presents results from the test of Model 3, testing the impact of MNC on the 
persistence of implicit actual ETR, in Column 1. Column 2 presents results testing the 
impact of MNC_Non and MNC_Haven on the persistence of implicit actual ETR. This 
test is run on the smaller sample due to limitations in the haven data. MNC takes the 
value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations and 0 otherwise. MNC_Non takes the 
value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations that are not in a haven country and 0 
otherwise. MNC_Haven takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations in 
one or more haven countries, and 0 otherwise. Year fixed effects are included. All 
standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. ***, **, and *, indicate significance 
(two-tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  51 
Table 6: Association between Foreign Operations and Havens and 
Management Forecast Likelihood and Accuracy 
          
Panel A: Likelihood of Management Earnings Forecast 
DV: Management EPS Forecast Issuance 
  
Coefficient 
z-stat 
Coefficient 
z-stat 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.0180 *** 0.4069 ** 
 7.25   2.35  
MNC 0.5861 ***    
 9.41      
MNC_Non     0.4200 *** 
     5.23  
MNC_Haven     0.7750 *** 
     10.41  
Size -0.0770 *** 0.0275  
 -4.30   1.16  
MtoB 0.0004   -0.0005  
 0.08   -0.09  
NAnalyst 0.0707 *** 0.0474 *** 
 13.79   7.51  
Loss -1.504 *** -1.2810 *** 
 -20.83   -16.66  
  n = 29,627 n = 20,108 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
F-test of MNC_Non = MNC_Haven, p-value = 0.0000 
 
Continued on next page. 
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Panel B: Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecast 
DV: Management EPS Forecast Error 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
Coefficient 
t-stat 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept 184.8   -0.2433 ** 
 1.00   -2.02  
MNC 63.76      
 1.00      
MNC_Non     -0.0137  
     -0.19  
MNC_Haven     0.1848  
     1.12  
Size -30.23   0.0901 ** 
 -1.00   2.47  
MtoB -2.338   -0.0350  
 -1.00   -0.80  
NAnalyst -1.319   0.0557  
 -0.96   0.83  
Loss -73.57   0.8231 *** 
 -0.99   5.47  
  n = 10,909 n = 8,489 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
This table presents results of tests of management's likelihood to issue earnings forecast and 
manager earnings forecast accuracy. Panel A presents results from the test of Model 4, to test 
the likelihood of management issuing an EPS forecast as impacted by MNC and a set of control 
variables known to affect the propensity for voluntary disclosure, in Column 1. Column 2 
presents results testing the likelihood of management issuing an EPS forecast as impacted by 
MNC_Non and MNC_Haven and a set of control variables known to affect the propensity for 
voluntary disclosure. Column 2 is run on a smaller sample due to limitations in the Haven data. 
Panel B presents results testing the effect of MNC and MNC_Non and MNC_Haven on the 
accuracy of management's earnings forecasts. MNC takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with 
foreign operations and 0 for domestic-only firms. MNC_Non takes the value of 1 for a U.S. 
firm with foreign operations that are not in a haven country and 0 otherwise. MNC_Haven takes 
the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations in one or more haven countries, and 0 
otherwise. All other variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. ***, **, and *, indicate significance 
(two-tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Association between Loss and Analysts' Implicit ETR 
Forecast Error 
Panel A: Loss Firms 
DV: Median consensus absolute implicit ETR forecast error 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
Intercept 0.1396 *** 
 5.12  
MNC 0.0218 ** 
 2.49  
Loss 0.0618 ** 
 2.08  
MNC*Loss 0.0961 ** 
 2.11  
Size -0.0102 *** 
 -3.16  
MtoB -0.0035 *** 
 -4.38  
NAnalyst -0.0013 ** 
 -2.07  
Accruals -0.1214 * 
 -1.65  
LagFE 0.3690 *** 
  6.64   
  n = 12,534 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Continued on next page. 
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Panel B: Foreign versus Domestic Loss 
DV: Median consensus absolute implicit ETR forecast error 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
Intercept 0.1986 *** 
 5.21  
DomesticLoss 0.1197 *** 
 5.38  
ForeignLoss 0.0571 *** 
 2.85  
BothLoss 0.2012 *** 
 4.33  
Size -0.0204 *** 
 -4.77  
MtoB -0.0017 * 
 -1.65  
NAnalyst -0.0005  
 -0.69  
Accruals -0.1551  
 -1.19  
LagFE 0.3747 *** 
  5.87   
  n = 7,337 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
F-test of DomesticLoss = ForeignLoss, p-value = 0.0286 
F-test of DomesticLoss = BothLoss, p-value = 0.1222 
F-test of ForeignLoss = BothLoss, p-value = 0.0042 
This table presents results of the effect of firm loss on the implicit absolute ETR 
forecast error. Panel A tests loss overall on the full sample of domestic and 
multinational firms. Panel B uses the sample of multinational firms to test the 
difference between domestic loss, foreign loss, and a loss both domestically and 
foreign. MNC takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign operations and 0 for 
domestic-only firms. DomesticLoss takes a value of 1 for firms with pre-tax 
domestic income less than 0 but pre-tax foreign income greater than 0. ForeignLoss 
takes a value of 1 for firms with domestic pre-tax income greater than 0 but foreign 
pre-tax inome less than 0. BothLoss takes a value of 1 for firms with both domestic 
and foreign pre-tax income less than 0. All other variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix A. Year fixed effects are included. All standard errors are robust and 
clustered by firm. ***, **, and *, indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
DV: Standardized market-adjusted 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
  
Coefficient 
t-stat 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.1452  -0.1461  -0.1910   -0.2379   
 -0.68  -0.69  -0.89  -1.08  
EPS_FE 0.1134 **          
 2.52           
Tax_FE    0.1265 ** 0.2529 ** 0.0715  
    1.99  2.04  0.73  
NonTax_FE    0.1140 ** 0.1497 *** 0.1251 ** 
    2.52  3.13  2.35  
MNC       0.1170 **    
       2.52     
MNC*Tax_FE       -0.1527     
       -1.10     
MNC*NonTax_FE       -0.0404     
       -0.56     
MNC_Non          -0.0004  
          -0.01  
MNC_Non*Tax_FE          0.179  
          0.68  
MNC_Non*NonTax_FE          0.0762  
          0.70  
MNC_Haven          0.0819  
          1.47  
MNC_Haven*Tax_FE          0.1053  
          0.80  
MNC_Haven*NonTax_FE          0.0036  
          0.05  
Size 0.0178  0.0180  0.0112  0.0191  
 1.41  1.43  0.86  1.33  
MtoB 0.0083  0.0083  0.0082  0.0078  
 1.54  1.53  1.52  1.32  
Momentum -3.1027  -3.1012  -3.1050  -2.2402  
  -1.38   -1.38   -0.89   -0.87   
  n = 10,761 n = 10,761 n = 10,761 n = 8,694 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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  F-test of (2): Tax_FE = NonTax_FE, p-value = 0.7531 
  F-test of (3): Tax_FE = NonTax_FE, p-value = 0.2843 
  
F-test of (3): (Tax_FE+MNC*Tax_FE) = 
(NonTax_FE+MNC*NonTax_FE), p-value = 0.7922 
This table presents results from the tests of Models 5 and 7. Column 1 reports results of the test of the market 
response to analyst EPS forecast error. Column 2 presents results testing the market response to the two 
components of earnings forecast error: non-tax earnings forecast error (NonTax_FE) and tax forecast error 
(Tax_FE). Column 3 present results of the test of the market response to the two components of the earnings 
forecast error interacted with MNC. Column 4 present results of the test of the market response to the two 
components of the earnings forecast error interacted with MNC_Non and MNC_Haven. Column 4 is run on a 
smaller sample due to limitations in the Haven data. The dependent variable is the standardized 3-day market-
adjusted returns centered on the earnings announcement date. MNC takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with 
foreign operations and 0 for domestic-only firms. MNC_Non takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with foreign 
operations that are not in a haven country and 0 otherwise. MNC_Haven takes the value of 1 for a U.S. firm with 
foreign operations in one or more haven countries, and 0 otherwise. All other variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix A. All standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. ***, **, and *, indicate significance (two-
tailed) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
